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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Zoning-Non-Conforming Uses and Variance
Earlier in the term, in the case Crossroads Recreation, Inc. v. Broz,'8 the
Court had concerned itself with another phase of non-conforming uses. Zoning
ordinances, recognizing that peculiar hardship may result in particular cases,
generally provide for variances, special permission to carry on a non-conforming
use notwithstanding the zoning qualifications. 19 Unlike pre-existing non-con-
forming uses (where the owner has obtained a vested right in the property prior
to the zoning restrictions and retroactive enforcement would :ause "serious
financial harm"2 0), the applicant has no absolute right to ignore the zoning re-
quirements but can only address himself to the sound administrative discretion
of the board." '
In 1939, the Court of Appeals, in the case Otto v. Steinhilber,22 laid down
the requisites for the granting of a variance on the basis of hardship as the
establishment of the fact that the property cannot be profitably used (that is, so
as to give a reasonable return) within the restrictions of the zoning ordinance,
that the harm suffered by the applicant under the zoning ordinance is peculiar
to himself and not general to the community (resulting, for instance, from gen-
eral decline of the neighborhood), and that the granting of the variance will not
alter the essential nature of the neighborhood. The courts have generally favored
the very sparing use of the power of variance.' Thus, where an applicant desired
to erect a building for business purposes in a residential zone, he was not per-
mitted to have a variance even though it appeared that he could not possibly
make a profit by using the property for residential purposes. The fact that an
entire area has declined would be aggravated by the granting of variances to cer-
tain persons. In such a situation, the proper remedy was for reconsideration of the
zoning plan as a whole.23
In the instant case, a gas station had been established on a piece of prop-
erty in 1929, the owner obtained the property in 1939, and in 1945, a local ordi-
nance was amended so as to exclude gas stations from the area. Admittedly,
the owner had a right to continue the non-conforming use since 'it pre-existed
18. 4 N.Y.2d 39, 172 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1958).
19. The granting of variances in hardship cases is provided for by statute,
although the criterion may be relaxed by local ordinance. See N. Y. GEN. CITY
LAW §81(4), N. Y. TOWN LAW §267 (5), and N. Y. VILLAGE LAw §179-b.
20. People v. Miller, supra note 5.
21. Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Building Corp., 229 N.Y. 313, 317, 128 N.E.
209, 210 (1920).
22. 282 N.Y. 71, 24 N.E.2d 851 (1939).
23. See Young Women's Hebrew Ass'n v. Board of Standards and Appeals,
266 N.Y. 270, 194 N.E. 751 (1935).
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the restriction. However, he had no right to expand or enlarge that use in viola-
tion of the zoning requirements. 24
In 1955, the owner entered into a contract with a proposed lessee, whereby,
if permission were obtained from the local authorities, the lessee was to enter into
a twenty-year lease, tear down the old station, and erect a completely new one
in its place with increased and modern facilities, rest rooms, etc., and pay the
owner a monthly rental greater that that which the owner had been able to obtain
previously. On application of the parties for a variance, the board refused the
same, holding that the requisite hardship for a variance had not been shown.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. The applicants had not presented proof to
sustain the burden which they had to qualify under the Otto standards. The
Court suggested that this might have been done by showing specific facts such
as the current income from the property, the original costs of the property, pre-
sent value, encumbered indebtedness thereon, etc. In order to determine whether
the permitted use of the property would give a reasonable return, it had to be first
shown what a reasonable return would be. All that had been shown was that it
was difficult to compete with more modern stations in the neighborhood, without
any actual showing that the property did not or could not, within the permitted
uses (which, of course, included the non-conforming use of the property in its
condition prior to the amendment of the local zoning ordinance) show a profit.
The applicants had pointed out that similar variances- had been granted
others in the neighborhood. However, this did not help their argument, since
they did not show that the other cases were exactly similar to their own. And
furthermore, the granting of variances to others does not invest them with a
right to a variance. The policy of a local zoning ordinance may be to permit
a few non-conforming uses for hardship situations, but this does not mean that
if there are to be any non-conforming uses, there shall be an unlimited amount
permissible..2 5 Nor is the fact that the improvements would "beautify" the pro-
perty pertinent. 26 The standard is strictly whether a reasonable return can be
achieved within the ordinance. The fact that a more profitable use could be put
to the property outside the zoning restrictions or that other unrelated benefits to
the community might result by permitting the variance does not enter into the
question.2 7
24. Chandler v. Corbett, 274 App.Div. 1073, 86 N.Y.S.2d 646 (2d Dep't 1949).
The privilege to expand may, however, be granted by ordinance. See 440 East
102nd Street Corp. v. Murdock, 285 N.Y. 298, 34 N.E.2d 329 (1941).
25. People ex rel. Werner v. Walsh, 212 App.Div. 635, 209 N.Y. Supp. 454(1st Dep't 1925), aff'd 240 N.Y. 689, 148 N.E. 760 (1925).
26. Fortuna v. Board of Standards and Appeals, 257 App.Div. 993, 13 N.Y.S.
2d 712 (2d Dep't 1939), aff'd 281 N.Y. 763, 24 N.E.2d 21 (1939).
27. Cf. Young Women's Hebrew Ass'n. v. Board of Standards and Appeals,
supra note 23.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Judge Van Voorhis, the lone dissenter, appeared to be arguing not that a
variance should be granted, but that the applicants had an absolute right to build
the new station. The applicants had a "vested right in the prior use of the sub-
ject -:operty"; since it had been a gas station before the ordinance, it could con-
tinue to be one afterwards. And it could be remodeled, reconstructed, and
modernized if need be to keep up with modern needs. Otherwise, the owner
would be driven out of business by the necessity of maintaining his premises
in 1929 style for 1958 requirements. The successful businessman, whose in-
creased business required modernization and expansion would be held back,
whereas the failure might continue to operate an obsolete establishment so long
as he desired.
The dissent seems to miss the point entirely. The policy of the zoning
statutes being to discourage and eventually eliminate non-conforming uses,281
there is no inconsistency in holding that they may continue so long as they can
be used in the condition they are in but that they cannot be subsequently en-
larged or modernized by a basic structural change. The property interests of the
owner demand an exception as to his vested rights prior to the enactment of
the ordinance, but do not mean that he should be placed in a unique position of
being able to flout the statute in the future; the continuation of prior existing
non-conforming uses as of right is not to grant a perpetual monopoly to the land-
owner, but merely to avoid confiscation of his property before he has received
his return from prior vested interests. Actually, the request for a variance is in-
consistent with any theory of there being a right arising out of the prior existing
use.2 9 The variance is to be granted where no such right exists; if there is such
a right, no variance is necessary or should be granted.
As a matter of practicality, there appears to be no good reason why one
who is contemplating the destruction of an existing structure and the erection
of a new one should not be required to comply with the zoning ordinances just
as would one entering vacant land with initial construction in mind. This is all
the more clear after a case such as the Harbison decision30 has established that
a municipality may reasonably provide for the termination of a prior non-con-
forming use.
Authority of Town to Establish Park Within Village Limits
In Village of Lloyd Harbor v. Town of Huntingtonal the town sought a
reversal of the Appellate Division's judgment that a 1955 statute authorizing it
28. Supra note 7.
29. National Lumber Products v. Ponzio, 133 N.J.L. 95, 42 A.2d 753 (1945).
30. Supra note 1.
31. 4 N.Y.2d 182, 173 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1958).
